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Abstract 
The purpose of this deliverable is to present our final results from the Travel Agent case 
study and through that investigate integration issues amongst computer systems that 
belong to different organizations, are placed behind strong organizational boundaries and 
handled within multiple domains of management. The conclusions have been drawn 
mainly from the Travel Agent (TA) case study although some examples have been drawn 
from the EXaMINE case study which we studied in the later stages of the DSoS project. 
The document is outlined as follows. We are presenting and discussing a number of 
results that we received from the case studies in the last few months and since our last 
deliverable [PCE4]. We will show that in order to address the issues raised by the case 
studies we need to carefully think about the architecting of a Systems of Systems (SoS). 
Note here that we are interested not merely in the architecture but in the process of 
architecting i.e. the rationale behind providing an adequate architecture that addresses the 
issues surrounding systems of systems i.e. autonomous systems, that are integrated while 
maintaining their organizational boundaries.  
 
1. Introduction 
What we have learned so far is that building systems of systems is not by any means a 
only technical challenge. In fact many of the major problems in the TA case study and 
most of the problems in the EXaMINE case study stemmed from organizational issues. 
 
The notion of a SoS challenges one aspect of software engineering that we have so far 
been taking for granted. Traditionally since information systems existed within an 
organizational domain they reflected the strategy, market, political and economic culture 
and history of the organization which they belonged. Since all these aspects stem from 
the same source (the organizational or in the case of EXaMINE the nation) the emphasis 
was put into how to simulate and incorporate these aspects into an operating system. 
Change or evolution has always been a difficult issue to deal with in technical terms 
although vital in the survival of systems. Open systems architectures and frameworks 
serve well as vehicles for dealing with this issue. The SoS however challenges the main 
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assumption. Since we put together autonomous systems i.e. systems with existing 
strategic, tactical and operational goals, political and economic culture and history, issues 
such as common interest or common goals (if they exist) have to be made explicit.  
 
So where are these issues made explicit?  
 
Our interest is mainly in dependability and we are therefore trying to provide a 
framework for putting together systems in a dependable manner. The notion of SoS 
however challenges this issue too. Another assumption we have also been taking for 
granted is that of a universal (or system wide) judge. A Judge which identifies faults, 
errors and deviation of intended service. This notion of judgment exists within the same 
organizational boundary as the information system and is exercised by the organization 
itself. When we put together systems of systems we also bring together these judging 
systems in a network of goals mapped onto computer systems, assessed by autonomous 
judgment systems. Bearing in mind that we have such a diversity of goals and “intended 
behavior” 
 
Who can judge the “intended behavior” of systems of systems and furthermore who is the 
judge of the System of Systems?    
 
In this deliverable (having already studied 2 case studies) we have identified that most 
problems or failure modes can be classified into composition, definition of the emerging 
service, communications and evolution and we therefore present these in turn in sections 
1,2 and 3. We also however acknowledge the fact that a system of systems, the very 
notion itself creates a new problem space which needs to be explored. At this point of 
time we lack the conceptual tools that would allow us to study this problem space. We 
therefore need a framework that addresses all issues we have discussed in this and other 
deliverables so far. In the sections 4 and 5 of the document we attempt to provide some 
concepts which we feel are useful for enabling SoS developers to think and investigate 
such SoS related issues. 
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We show the need to investigate this ‘new’ problem space (i.e. integration between 
systems that cross organizational boundaries) using abstract concepts in terms of roles 
and responsibilities [PJD2002] as well as the relations between them which we analyze in 
terms of conversation theory [MD1999]. Following a number of observations about these 
analyses techniques, the document concludes with a discussion of future research in this 
area. 
 
2. Architecting a System of Systems 
The interesting dimension that DSoS adds to large systems is that of multiple ownership 
which in cases implies distributed control. Current techniques such as UML do not 
address this issue or rather do not address this issue in the detail required. If control is 
distributed between the various sub-systems then we need to examine two things. Firstly 
the relation between subsystems and the responsibilities these sub-systems hold. Are they 
responsible for the benefit of each other? Are they sharing the same benefit by being 
related as part of a SoS? Can they share resources?  
 
Systems where multiple domains of management and control are involved belong to a 
particular class of systems and should be viewed from a different perspective. Traditional 
analysis techniques and solutions do not always apply. The fact that some modeling 
techniques have been successful in the sense that they provide a rich notation or a sound 
process for analyzing and describing systems does not imply that they are fit to be used 
everywhere.  
 
For the past 3 years we have dealt with a class of systems that required a lot more effort 
and collaboration between various disciplines in order to understand the extent of the 
problem and allow us to provide pragmatic solutions that address problems of a wider 
spectrum. We are moving towards developing re-usable, mobile pieces of code that can 
be used over the web via SOAP or over IIOP while at the same time maintaining their 
sense of autonomy.  
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Pieces of software that work as part of a larger structure can expose a number of 
interfaces that would allow them to be used by other structures as part of other systems 
which are again completely autonomous pursuing their own goals and objectives. We can 
actually implement software that can be successfully used as part of two distinct systems 
which are even based on different architectures. 
 
Some of the architectures [CORBA][JAVA RMI] employed for distributed components 
leave the code that is to become a distributed object completely untouched or unspoiled 
as some would say. Since the majority of the code is built as a wrapper then it is apparent 
that a piece of software can indeed be part of several architectures, responding to requests 
coming over SOAP or IIOP as well as calls made locally.  
 
When we talk about systems of distributed control then we ought to discuss 
responsibilities. Not responsibilities in the sense that class a has to perform a certain 
number of methods but responsibility in the broader sense of the word. Such that sub-
system y is responsible for carrying out process x successfully in order to maintain the 
state of affairs. Sub-system y is liable for performing x. If fault z is exposed to the world 
via the wider system, the world should also hold sub-system y liable only and not the 
wider system. This poses a number of challenges. First of all one may ask how do we 
make systems responsible and how do we identify responsibilities that can be held by 
each system? Furthermore how can we inform the world of the responsibilities held by 
each system when some of them may indeed be completely transparent. Existing 
notations such as UML or MOT do not address this issue. They are primarily concerned 
with computer systems where ownership is centralized. This does not imply by any 
means that processing is centralized but that there is a single domain of management 
controlling the entire system which may or may not be widely distributed. In our view 
this creates a new problem space that needs to be explored and the reason we want to 
explore this space is to be able to reason for an architectural style that addresses the 
issues raised in this document. Since we are viewing systems in a different light we 
cannot assume design patterns that have been successful in the past. We need to question 
design decisions and assumptions that experienced software engineers would take for 
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granted. Computer systems reflect organizational purpose, objectives, goals. In the case 
of system of systems they also reflect contractual agreements between participating 
components. There is a large body of literature on how to build computer systems that 
reflect organizational objectives but we lack literature, tools and general engineering 
concepts that allow us to build systems that reflect co-operation between organizations 
and therefore simulate these contractual agreements. Therefore we need to view computer 
systems that participate in a larger SoS in terms of the role they play, responsibilities they 
hold and duties they need to perform in order to maintain the state of affairs. In the 
following section we take a look at some of the final results and observations drawn from 
our case studies before we discuss a more generic framework for exploring some of the 
issues (composition, evolution, transaction) this new problem space sets. 
 
3. Case Study Results and Observations 
In this part of the document we are addressing a number of issues that were raised during 
the later development of the TA [DMS3] study and also presenting some observations 
from EXaMINE [EXaMINE1]. All the problems that we are discussing here stem from 
the way the ‘emerging service’ is composed, regulated, operates and evolves bearing in 
mind that all these aspects are dependent on the individual autonomous systems that are 
coordinated to provide the emerging service. We discuss each on them in turn. 
 
Composition 
We view composition of the “emerging service” as the process that ensures that goals 
embedded in the design and execution of individual autonomous systems does not bring 
the services of the SoS into conflict. We consider this view appropriate since the 
composition of the emerging service is based on systems of diverse objectives, 
operational policies, architectural styles and implementation. In other cases (EXaMINE) 
these conflicts may take the form of political or social disputes. Having already reported 
on the issues regarding the crossing of organisational boundaries and fault tolerant 
policies in SoS [PCE4], we need to look how goals embedded into an autonomous system 
can affect the composition of the SoS. In particular we want to identify, eliminate, and 
reconcile conflicting goals while at the same time promote complementary ones. Note 
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here that we use the term goal in order to abstract from both case studies since in the TA 
what we regard as goals maps onto organisational strategy and in the case of EXaMINE 
maps onto national interest. In both cases however is important to acknowledge the need 
for composing emerging services according to a rationale. Bear in mind that the purpose 
of a system of systems is to compose an ‘emerging service’ by making use of existing 
services offered by autonomous systems, each of which has its own goals, culture, history 
etc.This need for rationalizing on certain configurations of the emerging service became 
apparent during the structuring of the TA case study and in particular while considering 
the levels of exception handling. 
  
We have showed already [RPZ2003] that in distributed systems of systems there are 
several layers of exception handling. Each layer addresses a particular level of the system 
namely the servers, clients and middleware. There is however another layer of exceptions 
that do not manifest themselves as typical faults to be captured by the application or the 
compiler or the runtime environment (regardless of the consequences). We are referring 
to exceptions that manifest themselves as data inconsistencies, data inadequacies or data 
mismatches.  
 
In particular in the cases where data obtained via the different autonomous booking 
systems could not be composed into an item because the data was addressing a different 
type of client, the policies regarding cancellation were inconsistent, or at times, dates of 
the items on offer did not match. Similarly, in the context of the EXAMINE case study 
[EXAMINE1] composing an EU-wide EPS (electric power system) would require an 
overall control to be exercised by some authority governing body responsible for the 
entire system. In this example the policy mismatches we mentioned in the TA would 
manifest themselves as political conflicts since national interests prevail over EU law.  
 
Going back to computer based system of systems, in order to identify these types of 
exceptions we need to perform additional handling as well as enrich the conditions under 
which data is composed into an emerging service. Furthermore the need for intelligent 
and dependable composition becomes apparent when we consider different types of 
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clients. A web client for example may serve well for providing the user with a variety of 
items and involving him in the selection process. A WAP (wireless application protocol) 
client however is a lot more restricted and requires more precise composition. It has 
already been discussed [AL2001] that goal-orientated approaches to system composition 
can increase the visibility of goal-relationships that can exist. This is an important benefit 
of such a compositional approach as such goal-relationships will be subtly specific to the 
particular compositional context and require greater insight into their evaluation and 
design. However, more generally, it can be seen that three principal relationships can 
exist between associated goals that may result from contributing autonomous components 
in DSoS. First, there are complementary goal-relationships that have a reinforcing affect 
upon each other. As an example consider integrating two systems that target the same 
market base. Such relationships require little, if any, recomposing (and cannot only be 
readily integrated) but increase the dependability and value of the emergent service. One 
of the requirements of the EU EPS is a common market environment (open market) 
where all participating systems adhere to the laws of trading and competition. Secondly, 
in some situations, whilst goal-relationships may not be complementary, in a pre-existing 
sense, they may still be compatible – in terms of being more readily reconcilable with 
each other through conceiving alternative compositional approaches to achieving an 
emergent service. Compatible communication protocols would allow integration between 
components. Continuous monitoring of the performance could reveal further information 
regarding embedded goals. Lastly, and inevitably, there exist conflicting goal 
relationships. It is important that such relationships between autonomous components are 
identified early so that increased compositional effort can be focused on these areas to 
influence either the appropriate selection of alternative (and more accommodating) 
components or to ensure that such relationships have the major influence on the 
architecting of the envisaged coordination system. In some situations this may involve 
configuration of conflicting goals into higher or lower prioritisation status. 
 
Definition of Emerging Service 
Since we have talked about the need to compose the emerging service according to some 
rationale, we should stress that the rationale of such a composition should stem from the 
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regulations of the emerging service. We identified during the development of the TA case 
study that the emerging service is more thab just a front end between the consumer and 
the service providers (autonomous systems), that manages transactions via exception 
handling schemes. Similarly in the EXaMINE case study a European Wide EPS cannot 
be a network of interconnected national grids. There has to be regulation regarding its 
operation. Regardless of the time of its physical existence it needs to be regulated in 
terms of scope and operational policies. It is only then that intelligent composition can 
really take place. The scope of the emerging service determines the type of consumer. 
Immediately this enables the composition process to reason about the type of autonomous 
systems that can be utilized since the consumer types would need to be similar. Also 
operational policies that regulate how the emerging service should be provided would 
allow not only to reason about the compositional semantics but also determine the type of 
functionality the SoS would need to provide. Composing an emerging service it has been 
proved not to be as easy as putting together (or even wrapping) methods borrowed from 
autonomous systems. Additional consideration is needed when the SoS ‘adopts’ a method 
from a component system in order to carry out a service. Although wrapping allows us to 
an extent control the I/O of the method it does not resolve problems stemming from the 
mismatches between operational policies that may exist between the SoS and the 
autonomous systems. An example of this can be the cancellation method of hotel booking 
systems. Although a large number of them would only require the booking reference 
number, policies regarding cancellations varies considerably. All sorts of problems arise 
when these policies do not match the policies of the SoS namely maintaining the state, 
coordinating the transactions (as we shall see later), carrying out compensation etc. 
Let us now take the extreme view (as in EXaMINE) that the service or product of each 
autonomous system is of strategic importance. The EXaMINE case study has been 
looking into composing national grids into a network of networks or a SoS that manages 
power distribution. The regulation process would have to be managed by all participants 
since it directly affects national interests. Whereas the TA could remain centrally 
controlled in the case of EXaMINE control and balance of power are the foremost causes 
of “failure”. Whereas in the TA organizational failure manifested itself as data 
inadequacies, incompatibilities etc, in the EXaMINE study these can result in political 
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disputes. We therefore argue that the emerging service itself needs to be regulated. In 
technical terms, policies regarding scope and operations would need to be represented in 
data structures that would in turn be used to reason (accept or reject) certain 
configurations. This need is even more apparent when one considers evolutionary aspects 
of autonomous systems. We need some way to capturing those and making sure that the 
composition of the emerging service from individual autonomous systems (and therefore 
their policies) reflects what the emerging service is regulated to provide. 
 
Operations / Transactional Handling 
The travel agent case study [DMS3] is concerned with multi-party transactions which are 
distributed over many locations and which may require a considerable time to complete. 
Each party in such a transaction has a set of pre-conditions and a set of post-conditions 
which must be met before the transaction is judged to have been successful from that 
party’s point of view. Thus, for a transaction to be judged to be well formed, the 
evidence, embodied in a set of instruments, must reliably reflect the intended acts of 
remote parties. For this to be the case, there are three characteristics of the instruments 
and the operations on them which must be assumed: 
 
Atomicity: specific actions occur exactly once or not at all and the parties are able to 
confirm completion of an action. 
Persistence: once information is generated it does not disappear; it may be changed, but 
the instrument(s) must record the original and the changed information. 
Security: which, in this case, also refers to the authenticity and integrity of information 
represented in instruments. 
 
The TA case study is structured using CA actions[Zorzo et al. 2003]. We use multiparty 
transactions to carry out specific functions such as ‘booking’, and we place these within a 
context (which can be thought of as a box) inside which exception handling occurs. The 
problem that was raised with this type of structuring is handling long term transactions. 
Although in the majority of cases the 30 second time-out rule employed by some 
architectures is adequate to deal with network delays, there are cases where the nature of 
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the transaction is such that it requires a much longer time span. The problems that arise 
by in situation are several. 
 
Consider the following example. We have mentioned that the SoS TA allows us to book a 
full trip by conducting the appropriate methods of booking systems. The autonomous 
booking systems operate their individual cancellation policies. By placing all transactions 
that handle availability checking, booking, payment and cancellation within one context 
(as a multiparty transaction) we are facing a serious problem; that of the state. 
Cancellation concerning a trip or an item of a trip, is an action that has a large time span. 
Hotels may allow 2 days after initial booking has been made. This poses the question of 
how do we handle such a transaction while at the same time maintain it as part of the 
same context; that of buying a full trip. 
 
By placing the cancellation action outside the context we immediately need to make 
arrangements for maintaining certain data about the user, the trip and booking systems we 
used etc. by maintaining the action inside we need to maintain the box i.e. its state. The 
state however is not controlled by the SoS since booking systems work independently.  
 
We need therefore to recognize that with transactions that cross multiple domains of 
management notions such as persistence and atomicity cannot be assumed. 
 
There are two configurations of the relationships of a multi-party transaction at the 
structural1 level: 
• A centralised transaction monitor in which each of the participants has a direct 
relationship with one particular participant in the role of transaction manager. The logical 
point of co-ordination is also a physical point of control. 
• Distributed transaction management, in which each participant undertakes 
transaction management responsibilities and the logical point of co-ordination is, in fact, 
                                                  
1
 In this discussion, the term “structural” applies to the roles and responsibilities of the actors directly participating 
in the DSoS while “infrastructural” roles and relationships are those associated with the deployment of reusable, 
generic resources which are exploited in the execution of structural relationships. 
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replicated and distributed. 
 
In the first approach, which is implemented by transaction monitoring functionality, all 
transacting parties must have a pre-defined relationship with one particular party 
responsible for the co-ordination. “Pre-defined” here means that these relationships were 
established outside the context and infrastructure in which the transactions will be 
executed. In the second, which is implemented in distributed transaction management, 
each party depends on all the others and must be able to monitor and interpret their acts.  
These two approaches to the allocation of responsibilities in a distributed transaction 
result in a different relationship between structural and infrastructural responsibilities. 
Atomicity of operations, persistence of information and security, authenticity and 
integrity of messages are dependabilities or qualities of service which are delivered at the 
structural level either as end-to-end or centralised mechanisms. 
 
In the case of a distributed transaction, the economies of provision are quite different. 
Since each participant takes responsibility for components of the transaction and needs to 
be able to monitor remote activities and states, each needs to be able to rely on the quality 
of a set of service and applications components within their own domain and in each of 
those of the other participants. In this case, the pre-established relationship must be with 
the infrastructural suppliers and it is possible that the transacting parties are establishing a 
new context as well as a new instance of commerce. In this case, new instruments, which 
arise from the characteristics of the new context, may well be required. 
 
In the distributed approach to transaction management, and here we are concerned not 
merely with distribution over time and space but, more significantly, distribution over the 
boundaries of different enterprises, each enterprise must have the option and capability of 
replicating all of those aspects of transaction co-ordination which are relevant to their 
particular interests. They must also be able to rely on the provider of the infrastructural 
environment to ensure that their view of the current state of any transaction is coherent 
with the views of all the other participants of that transaction. Thus, atomicity, 
persistence and security become responsibilities of the environment provider and 
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infrastructural in nature, and it is these qualities of service and application which dictate 
the characteristics of the instruments of the structural conversations. 
 
Evolution 
A SoS is built by integrating systems which might be under the control of organisations 
totally separate from that commissioning the overall SoS. (We will refer to the existing 
(separate) systems as “components” although this must not confuse the question of their 
separate ownership). In this situation, it is unrealistic to assume that all changes to the 
interfaces of such components will be notified. In fact, in many interesting cases, the 
organisation responsible for the components may not be aware of (all of) the systems 
using its component. One of the most challenging problems faced by researchers and 
developers constructing dependable systems of systems (DSoSs) is, therefore, dealing 
with on-line (or unanticipated) upgrades of component systems in a way which does not 
interrupt the availability of the overall SoS. It is useful to contrast evolutionary 
(unanticipated) upgrades with the case where changes are programmed (anticipated). In 
the spirit of other work on dependable systems, the approach taken here is to catch as 
many changes as possible with exception handling mechanisms. Dependable systems of 
systems are made up of loosely coupled, autonomous component systems whose owners 
may not be aware of the fact that their system is involved in a bigger system. The 
components can change without giving any warning (in some application areas, e.g. web 
services, this is a normal situation). The drivers for on-line software upgrading are well 
known: correcting bugs, improving (non-) functionality (e.g. improving performance, 
replacing an algorithm with a faster one), adding new features, and reacting to changes in 
the environment. When a component is upgraded without correct reconfiguration or 
upgrading of the enclosing system, problems similar to ones caused by faults occur, for 
example: loss of money, TA service failures, deterioration of the quality of TA service, 
misuse of component systems. Changes to components can occur at both the structural 
and semantic level. For example changes of a component system can result in a revision 
of the units in which parameters are measured (e.g. from Francs to Euro), in the number 
of parameters expected by an operation (e.g. when an airline introduces a new type of 
service), in the sequence of information to be exchanged between the TA and a 
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component system (e.g. after upgrading a hotel booking server requires that a credit card 
number is introduced before the booking starts). In the extreme, components might cease 
to exist and new components must be accommodated. 
 
Although there are several existing partial approaches to these problems, they are not 
generally applicable in our context. For example, some solutions deal only with 
programmed change where all possible ways of upgrading are hard-wired into the design 
and information about upgrading is always passed between components. This does not 
work in our context in which we deal with pre-existing component systems but still want 
to be able to deal with interface upgrading in a safe and reasonable fashion. Other 
approaches that attempt to deal with unanticipated or evolutionary change in a way that 
makes dynamic reconfiguration transparent to the TA integrators may be found in the AI 
field. We believe that we need to use fault tolerance as the paradigm for dealing with 
interface changes: specific changes are clearly abnormal situations (even if the 
developers accept their occurrence is inevitable), and we view them as errors of the 
integrated DSoS in the terminology accepted in the dependability community. Error 
detection aims at earlier detection of interface changes to assist in protecting the whole 
system from the failures which they can cause. For example, it is possible that, because of 
an undetected change in the interface, an input parameter is misinterpreted (a year is 
interpreted as a number of days the client is intending to stay in a hotel) causing serious 
harm. Error recovery follows error detection and can consist of a number of levels: in the 
best case dynamically reconfiguring the component/system and in the worst with a safe 
failure notification and off-line recovery.  
 
We also believe that we need a structured approach to dealing with interface changes that 
relies on multilevel exception handling which in turn should be incorporated into a DSoS. 
Promoting multilevel structuring of complex applications to make it easier for developers 
to deal with a number of problems, but our main focus here is structured handling of 
interface changes. The general idea is straightforward [Cristian 1995]: during DSoS 
design or integration, the developer identifies errors that can be detected at each level and 
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develops handlers for them; if handling is not possible at this level, an exception is 
propagated to the higher level and responsibility for recovery is passed to this level. In 
addition to this general scheme, study of some examples suggests classifications of 
changes which can be used as check lists. At this stage we would also like to 
acknowledge the need for communicating semantic information between component 
systems. Being able to communicate additional semantic information may resolve some 
of the conflicts presented in PCE4 but also enable better handling of interface upgrades. 
In the initial stages we found that in order to communicate semantic information between 
two components or in the case of the TA between the SoS and its providers we need a 
structured collection of information (meta-data) as well as a set of inference rules that can 
be used to conduct automated reasoning. Traditionally knowledge engineering [Hruska & 
Hashimoto 2000], as this process is often called, requires all participants to share the 
same definitions of concepts. In our case, for example, definitions of what is a trip or a 
flight as well as the parameters for each of these have to be defined and shared. The 
protocol for booking and paying for a trip or an item is also required. Detailed 
descriptions of the parameter types and their semantic information also need to be held in 
a shared knowledge base. Knowledge bases however and their usage does not necessarily 
make the system more flexible; quite the contrary. Requests would have to be performed 
under strict rules for inference and deduction. The SoS would have to process its 
metadata (globally shared data descriptions) in order to infer how to make a request for a 
particular method (i.e. booking a flight) and further more infer what parameters 
accompany this method and what is their meaning.  
  
4. Conversation Theory a Framework for analyzing SoS’s 
Having discussed our results and conclusions drawn from the two case studies it is 
apparent that what distinguishes a SoS from a distributed component system is the fact 
that control is also distributed. When control is distributed and in particular when there is 
no central authority to govern and take decisions then conflicts can arise and unexpected 
changes may take place. The question we ask in the rest of the document is whether some 
of these issues can be caught early in the pre-requirements engineering process. In order 
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to do something like this we would need to carefully explore this new problem space 
using new concepts that abstract from typical UML driven solution and design patterns. 
The theory of conversations [PP2000] is posited as (among other things) a tool to analyse 
social, commercial and organizational roles and relationships. The term ‘conversation’ is 
used in the normative sense to describe a relationship between two roles. Each 
conversation is described by attributes such as: significance, mutuality, capability and 
control. We do not attempt at this stage to provide transactional properties. We do 
however attempt to understand the nature of transactions at this abstract level. The aim of 
course is to detach the analysis from any bias on certain technologies and produce a list 
of requirements regarding the relationships between all participants of the SoS based on 
their roles, responsibilities and conversations. Viewed at the organizational level, 
conversations correspond to pre-defined contractual arrangements between systems. The 
degree of co-operation, trust and significance of such relationships is determined by the 
contractual arrangements agreed between the two systems. What we are proposing here is 
that since we can use conversation theory to determine or describe rather the nature of 
these relations, we could take a step further and make use of these descriptions to derive 
and understand the nature of such relations. Since transactions in a sense simulate a 
contractual agreement we want to use conversation theory in order to make this 
simulation process more accurate. Conversation patterns can indeed determine 
transactional patterns.  
 
We use the variable significance to indicate how the benefits of the relationship are being 
distributed. In the ‘Theory of Conversations’ significance can either be symmetrical 
(equal benefits) or asymmetrical (unequal benefits). We also use the variable mutuality to 
indicate how responsibilities are being distributed. Mutuality shows how responsible one 
system is for the benefits of the other. Capability is the variable that shows if resources 
are shared by two systems in order to fulfill their responsibilities. Finally we use the 
variable control to indicate which agent in a network has the power to initiate or 
terminate a relationship. If for example a conversation is of asymmetrical significance 
and mutuality is zero (i.e. none of the two component systems who are talking to each 
other are responsible for the other’s benefit) then we could not successfully implement an 
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atomic transaction. Atomicity requires a level of support that operates underneath the 
transaction and is agreed upon by both systems who are in conversation. Zero mutuality 
would indicate that such support layer does not exist. In the case of the travel agent the 
case study was build with conversations of zero mutuality and asymmetrical significance. 
The same pattern arises in the second case study since national interests and national 
security prevail. This corresponds to the view that participating systems are autonomous 
and they may not even know that they are in collaboration under the umbrella we call 
SoS. By combining various degrees of the variables of mutuality and significance certain 
patterns arise. The next paragraph describes them in more detail. 
 
Significance & Mutuality 
The following table shows all the possible combinations of the four variables and the 
resulting relationship types. In the first instance we will consider the values of  
significance and mutuality. As we mentioned earlier significance can range from 
asymmetrical to symmetrical and mutuality from high to low. The values of both of these 
variables are fuzzy and cannot be successfully determined unless they are based on real 
evidence. For the sake of the example and the case study we assume that the variables 
take only absolute values. Given this, 4 patterns of relations emerge. 
 
Conversation Significance Mutuality Properties 
A  (symmetric)  (high) ACID 
 
B (symmetric) (low) Exception 
Handling 
C (asymmetric)  (high) Atomic 
D (asymmetric) (low) Multi-
layered 
Handling 
        Table 1. Travel Agency Example 
 
In terms of significance and mutuality we distinguish between symmetric (benefits are 
equally distributed and both parties a equally responsible) and asymmetric relationships 
(one party benefits mostly and none of them is responsible for the benefit of the other). 
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The above table resulted in four possible combinations of significance and mutuality. 
Let’s take each one in turn. Conversation type A is defined in terms of symmetric 
significance and symmetric mutuality. Both parties enjoy equal benefits from the 
relationship and both are equally responsible for the benefits of the other. Many times the 
contractual arrangements between the two systems are such that one party is exclusively 
used by the other. The significance of this relationship is symmetrical as benefits are 
equally distributed. In terms of contractual arrangements the relationship is also mutual. 
This is because the party who initiated the relationship cannot dissolve it, (due to 
contractual arrangements) while the other party is not allowed to supply to other 
clients/agents. 
 
Conversation type B describes again relationships where although the benefits are equally 
distributed none of the parties is responsible for the benefit of the other. Again this type 
of relationship can be observed in a distributed environment as the one described earlier. 
The difference would be in the contract between the two parties where one party selects 
the best possible provider while the second is ready to provide its service to the best 
bidder. Conversation type A describes, in a sense co-operation whereas type B describes 
competition. 
 
Conversation type C implies a situation where only one of the parties enjoys the benefits 
of the relationship although mutuality is equal. Conversation type D reveals a parent child 
relationship of asymmetric significance and mutuality. It implies a situation where one 
party is putting the effort for the benefit of the other. In the travel agent case study all 
relationships between the SoS and its sub systems are of symmetric significance since 
both parties enjoy the benefits of such relation although they are not mutually 
responsible.  In symmetrically significant relationships although responsibility may not 
be present (i.e. low mutuality) both parties would be interested in maintaining the state of 
affairs as long as the relationship is beneficial. In the case of the EXaMINE case study 
this would directly related to the democratic accountability of the regulatory body (i.e. 
EU) and how democratically “power” and “authority” is distributed within the SoS. 
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The variable control indicates which of the parties in a conversation can initiate a 
conversation. In a distributed SoS control indicates which of the parties have higher 
authority or have a better position in a competitive market. In the case of the travel agent 
it is the SoS that has higher control since it is capable of initiating and terminating a 
transaction with its sub-systems. While in the case of EXaMINE control would have to 
remain equally distributed. 
 
Capability relates to the system’s ability to access resources. Low capability indicates that 
both components are responsible for acquiring their own resources. When capability is 
high then componets may have agreed upon using or sharing resources. In the travel 
agent example again capability is always low. This reflects the fact that the SoS although 
it has authority over initiating transactions it does not have access to the sub-systems 
databases. And this indicated the strong boundary that exists between the travel agent 
SoS and the participating booking systems. On the hand capability in the EXaMINE 
project is high since there is (at least this is the requirement) to access components of the 
system that may cross national boundaries. For example there is a requirement that all 
statistical data from the various national grids are available across the network. Since 
however control is presumed to be equally distributed decisions regarding initiating and 
terminating such a conversation is kept at the component level (national level) 
 
Since we can classify the relationships that appear within the context of the TA and 
EXaMINE case studies using conversations we could also use conversation descriptions 
to derive transactional properties that can be supported. 
 
5. Role and Responsibility Driven Analysis 
Putting systems together for the purpose of developing new systems that offer additional 
services requires some additional analysis. The ‘owners’ of these new services need to 
share the responsibilities of the new services which may indeed be collective although the 
degrees of responsibility change and at the same time it may not always be clear. Each of 
the systems will carry on performing a number of tasks as it did in each autonomous state 
(the state may or may not change). We call the tasks performed as part of the SoS duties 
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and so each system that is part of the system of systems has to perform its duties in order 
to maintain the ‘new’ services running. By studying the TA case study we can identify 
three combinations of duty-responsibility patterns that have different implications with 
regards to implementation. Outside the scope of the TA we can identify 4 patterns in 
total. As the examples later will illustrate it can be the case where duties are shared 
between two systems although responsibility of those duties lies within one single 
system. It can also be the case where duties are shared and responsibility is collective. 
Another case arises when responsibility of service and the duties that support this service 
remain within the boundaries of one system. Finally the are cases where the responsibility 
and duties may reside in completely separate different systems. Bear in mind that the 
‘”emerging service” is the outcome of putting autonomous systems together. It cannot 
exist without the collaboration of them all. In previous paragraphs we talked about the 
need for exploring this new problem space using concepts such as roles, responsibilities 
and conversations. By doing this we are building enterprise models. Before we delve into 
the analysis of these concepts here are some definitions. 
 
Definitions 
Enterprise models represent the concept of division and allocation of responsibilities to 
create a network of roles interacting through conversations. A Role can be considered as 
a composition of responsibilities which defines the boundaries of a system. A 
conversation between roles represents the context of a single or list of transactions for the 
generation and interpretation of information. Resources represent domains of ownership 
or instruments of communication and exchange. 
 
Analysis-Roles 
Roles are, as the definitions suggest holders of responsibilities. The first step of our 
analysis requires breaking down the participants into roles capable of holding some 
responsibility.  Responsibilities are broken down into duties which represent the tasks 
that roles need to perform in order to maintain a state of affairs. This would be agreed by 
the SoS regulator. The purpose of breaking down autonomous systems into roles is to 
examine whether certain roles are capable of holding certain responsibilities, the tasks 
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involved and boundaries that may exist between responsibility holder and duty execution 
(which is a common pattern in TA, more later). In the case of the EXaMINE case study 
the boundaries are political, social and economic as we showed in PCE4. In other system 
i.e. merging banks or large insurance companies the boundaries may primarily be legal. 
In the case of the TA the major boundary is organisational since it hinders information 
exchange and capability to share and access resources. The question that should be raised 
in this initial stage is whether roles have enough resources to execute their duties, what 
are the dependencies amongst the execution of the tasks as well as what sort of 
compensation schemes the SoS needs to support in order to handle failures. 
 
Analysis-Responsibilities 
The responsibility analysis is important in clarifying some of the implementation issues 
of the system. In this process we identify new services as well as the tasks for carrying 
out those services. We call these tasks duties since they are executed by roles who are the 
primary responsibility holders. Every duty is itself a process that may or may not carry a 
number of dependencies. When for example system a sends a request to systems b we 
can assume that system b has to be in a state ready to accept this request and 
consequently respond to it. There are a number of dependencies like this that can alter the 
way a service is executed and the way the system of systems is implemented. Each 
responsibility as we mentioned is associated with a number of duties, tasks. Given the 
nature of the task we can select an appropriate role to hold responsibility for these tasks. 
For example the TA is responsible for accepting a request from the User. So the TA 
should provide a form for accepting the User’s requirement. The TA is also responsible 
for sending this requirement to the reservation system. The reply to the user however, is 
collectively a responsibility of both the reservation system and the TA. The reservation 
system for example needs to be on line when the TA sends the request. Additionally it 
has to respond within the timescale posed by the TA. The reservation systems (since it is 
out of the control of the TA) can move from an online state to an offline state 
independently. The technical implication this will have is that the TA prior to sending a 
request to a specific reservation system has to check its state. It is fair to conclude at this 
point that the whole notion of responsibility analysis is derived by the lack of control the 
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SoS has on the behaviour of its individual components. Since there is a lack of overall 
control in the SoS, responsibility of service cannot be assumed exclusively by an 
individual component. This is something that will impact and should be considered when 
the communications infrastructure is being developed. From the analysis of the TA we 
have concluded that the impact of this lack of control will result in additional transactions 
between the various components in order to assess the state of each component at all 
times during the provision of the new service. The following diagrams show how 
responsibilities are shared for carrying out three basic functions. Notice the patterns we 
mentioned earlier regarding responsibility and duties. Some of them are shared between 
two systems while others remain central. The new service itself is being offered by a 
combination of all systems, although responsibility and duties change hands as the SoS 
moves in different states.  
 
        
SOS T.A
-Reservation
System On-line
-Compose/Send
Transaction
-Apply Time Limits
-Interpret Response
Send Data to
DSOS TA
Function
Show Availability
Booking
System
 
             Figure 1. Shared Duty-Single Responsibility 
 
The above diagram shows a basic function, the implementation of which has been broken 
down to 5 duties. The TA is applying a time limit within which it expects the request to 
be answered. It checks that the reservation system is on line (something it has no control 
of) and it composes and sends the transactions. The reservation system (assuming it is on 
line) sends a response which is then interpreted by the TA and presented to the user. 
Although transparent to the user the operation of this task is dependent on the reservation 
system. The gap between the two grey panels denotes organizational boundary. The 
responsibility however for performing such a task is passed to the travel agent. In 
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implementation terms the TA would be expected to direct the request to a different 
reservation system if one does not respond within the time limits or it is not available. 
Consider the following diagram. 
       
SOS T.A.
Check Availability of
Items
-Check Compatibility of
Items (Time/Date)
- Assemble Trip
Compose
Offer
    
   Figure 2. Single Duty-Single Responsibility 
 
The above function involves the composition of the items collected by all systems into 
full trips. The responsibility for the composition and its sub-tasks is passed to the TA. At 
this stage of booking, the reservation systems are not involved at all so the task of 
offering full trips to the users is implemented entirely by the TA. There are no 
dependencies at this stage between the TA and its sub-systems. Consider now the 
following diagram. 
  
-Reservation
System On-line
Send Confirmation
 to DSOS TA
Booking
systemSOS T.A.
-Compose/Send
transactions for Each Item
-Interpret Response
(confirm/decline)
Book Full Trip
 
    Figure 3. Shared Responsibility-Shared Duty 
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The function of booking the trip is entirely dependent on the reservation systems that 
offered the items in the first place and the responsibility of booking is also shared. The 
tasks or duties involved are composing and sending the transactions to each of the 
systems involved (flight, accommodation, car). Assuming that the systems are online then 
they should respond to the booking request and finally the TA should interpret the 
response and inform the user. It was pointed out earlier that the responsibilities of the 
individual systems involved accepting a request for availability or request for booking 
and responding to them either by showing availability of confirming a booking. The TA 
is the medium between the user and the reservation system that actually owns the items 
on offer. Although it is the responsibility of the TA to compose and send the transactions 
to its sub-systems it is not responsible for making the actual bookings. Although the TA 
may not have overall control, it can monitor the state of its sub-system and take 
appropriate action. The example above however may result in a situation that the TA 
cannot monitor. Consider that a booking of a full trip that consists of flight, 
accommodation and car rental would require the TA to transact with 3 systems, and get 
confirmation for all 3 items in order to confirm the booking to the user. Some of the 
situations that may arise are: 
 
• One of the reservation systems confirms a booking without actually making a booking 
due to a fault. 
• One of the reservation systems becomes unavailable 
• One of the reservation systems makes item unavailable 
• The TA gets confirmation for 2 out of the 3 items of the trip since the 3rd became 
unavailable.  
 
All of these situations can result in only part of the trip being booked because one of the 
items has either being booked by some other system or the system is now offline. The 
user’s requirement of a full trip is incomplete and therefore cannot be satisfied. A 
booking of two items of a full trip has been completed and are now unwanted. The user 
20/3/2003  DSoS Deliverable DSC3 24
cannot be charged since the trip is incomplete. The reservation system that went offline 
or made the item unavailable cannot be charged since it is not aware of its existence as 
part of SoS TA. Two of the reservation systems responded to the request for booking and 
confirmed the booking of the items requested. These systems are expecting payment. 
 
Analysis-Allocating Responsibilities 
We have showed how conversations are used to characterise relationship between the two 
systems. We also discussed the importance of the variables of control, capability 
significance and mutuality. Here we suggest that the system which has control of 
initiating a conversation is also responsible for that conversation. The TA case study 
accepts that the reservation systems involved are independent systems that do not 
communication with each other. The TA has to contact them in turn to build the trips 
offered to the user. Consider this diagram that shows shared duty/shared responsibility 
figure. 
DSOS T.A.
-Initiating a Transaction-
'requesting item details'
-Interpret Response Inform of Changes
Reservation
System
Initiating a transaction- 'is the
reservation system online'
Interpreting
Response
Response
Respond
Show
Availability
 
  Figure 4. Sharing Responsibilities 
 
All the transaction types are featured in this diagram. The SoS TA is initiating a 
transaction to identify whether the reservation system is online. The reservation system 
responds to the request. The SoS TA interprets the request and initiates a new transaction, 
requesting details of items on offer. The reservation system again responds and the SoS 
TA interprets that response. One could argue here that the response of the reservation 
system is responsibility of that system. The reason we distinguished responses and 
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initiations is to identify where the control of the conversation lies. When the TA initiates 
a transaction it would be responsible for interpreting the response. The response however 
could be ‘no message’. The reservation system may not reply at all to the initiation so the 
TA has to interpret this situation and take action. If the reservation system does not 
respond to an initiation then the TA who maintains control of the dialogue could request 
the services of some other system. 
 
Responsibility is held by the system is initiating, or interpreting a transaction. In the 
diagram above we have a dialogue between two systems. The SoS TA is attempting to 
identify what are the items on offer of the reservation system. It is initiating the 
conversation and but is also responsible for interpreting the responses. The interpretation 
duty may have to deal with no response at all. 
 
The reservation system at some point is initiating a transaction to inform of changes to 
the policies regarding the items on offer. It is therefore its responsibility of initiating this 
conversation and therefore informing the SoS TA of changes. So we share 
responsibilities according to which system owns the attribute of control. The attribute of 
control is not static but it can change dynamically as the example illustrated. It is 
therefore essential for both systems to be able to interpret these transactions initiated by 
both sides. In the case of the travel agent case study the SoS TA would need to be able to 
accept a transaction that informs of changes in policies or other details. 
 
The above figure illustrates some of the technical implications of this analysis. It suggests 
that the TA will be able to send requests to the reservation system via a specified 
interface, interpret its responses and furthermore deal with its exceptions. The issue of 
interpreting transactions initiated by the reservation system refers to the problem of 
dealing with exceptions thrown by the sub systems to the level above. Building interfaces 
to communicate with a system and maybe a wrapper to restrict its output it is not 
sufficient to implements a system such as the TA.  
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Developing a service that is transparent to the user does not imply only building 
transactions according to the interface specifications but also dealing with exceptions. If 
the application was to be entirely transparent the TA should be able to interpret 
transactions initiated by the reservation systems before presenting them to the user. This 
of course requires additional effort in analyzing the participating systems in depth and not 
just at the interface level in order to identify all possible exceptions. This process would 
help in building the appropriate exception handling mechanisms at the TA level. One 
would have to deal with the exceptions thrown by the sub system and decide whether to 
interpret them or pass them directly to the system above which is our case is the user. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this deliverable we presented a number of issues that were raised primarily from the 
TA case study and to a lesser extend by EXaMINE. Although there is a lot of literature 
on architecture and design we felt that there is little of work available to address SoS 
specific issues. The most important of those relate to the way the emerging service is 
composed, regulated, delivered (transactional model) and how it evolves. Since there are 
a number of tools and methodologies addressing structuring techniques and design 
patterns we concentrated on concepts that would allow us to look at this new problem 
space that a SoS addresses.  
We showed how boundaries that surround various systems can have an immediate affect 
in the way the system is perceived, developed and consequently delivered. One of the 
most important attributes we showed to be that of control. This is what distinguishes 
DSoS from other component based distributed system. By control we mean authority to 
regulate and impose structure and operational policy of the emerging service, but also to 
foresee future behavior of a system, initiate and terminate transactions as well as access 
to all component of a SoS. 
Given this additional dimension we believe that a responsibility driven analysis where 
systems are viewed as roles holding responsibilities would enable developers or 
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regulators of a SoS to capture certain type of non technical failures (organizational 
failures) early prior to the requirements analysis stage.  
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